Sutcliffe v Secretary of State for Education

The appellant, Joshua Sutcliffe, was a maths teacher and an evangelical Christian with strong views on gender identity, homosexuality, the sanctity of marriage between a man and a woman, and the role of men and women in society. Following a six day hearing, a professional conduct panel found him guilty of unacceptable professional conduct and of conduct that might bring the teaching profession into disrepute. The panel recommended that the Secretary of State should impose a prohibition order preventing him from teaching. The Secretary of State accepted the panel’s recommendation.

The case arose from the conflict between the appellant’s beliefs and his professional duties as a teacher. The panel heard evidence from pupils who were taught by the appellant including “Pupil A”, whose assigned sex at birth was female but who presented as male and used the preferred pronouns “he/him”, and who had only ever been known as male at the school. The allegations found proven by the panel included that: (i) the appellant had failed to use Pupil A’s preferred male pronouns whilst teaching; (ii) when appearing on “This Morning”, he had used female pronouns on multiple occasions when referring to Pupil A; (iii) when discussing homosexuality in a maths lesson he had told pupils about a person who had, through God, “stopped being gay” as it was “wrong”; and (iv) he had shown pupils a video which expressed partisan and controversial views about masculinity. The panel found numerous breaches of the Teachers’ Standards.

The appellant appealed to the High Court against the prohibition order. He challenged each of the findings of misconduct and the decision that a prohibition order was appropriate in light of those findings. His central argument was that the panel’s decision infringed his Articles 9 and 10 ECHR rights, whereas Pupil A had no legal right to insist on the use of his preferred pronouns. Most of the conduct alleged was, he asserted, a manifestation of his religious or philosophical beliefs. He argued that a refusal to allow conscientious objection fails to strike a proper balance between the competing interests.

Pepperall J dismissed the appeal on all grounds. He noted that the rights to manifest one’s religion and beliefs under Article 9(2) and to exercise one’s freedom of speech under Article 10(2) are qualified rights. It is fundamental that teachers should not only educate but that they should at all times treat the children in their care with dignity and respect and that they should safeguard their wellbeing. Insofar as the Teachers’ Standards qualify a teacher’s Articles 9 and 10 rights, such restrictions are proportionate.

As to the specific findings of misconduct, Pepperall J held:

• On points (i) and (ii) above, just because misgendering a transgender pupil might not be unlawful does not mean that it is appropriate conduct for a teacher or that, when done repeatedly and deliberately both in class and on national television in breach of the school’s instructions and ethos such that distress is caused to the child, it cannot amount to professional misconduct.
• On point (iii), the misconduct was not in talking about someone who formerly identified as gay, but in implying that a gay person might be cured and in the assertion that homosexuality was wrong without any regard for the gay and lesbian pupils in the classroom.
• On point (iv), there was no basis for interfering with the professional assessment of the panel and the Secretary of State that it was misconduct to show the video without allowing debate about contrary views.

On the issue of sanction, Pepperall J concluded that the appellant had failed to establish that the panel and the Secretary of State were wrong to decide that a prohibition order was necessary and proportionate in this case.

The case has attracted considerable media attention.

The judgment can be accessed here.

Iain Steele acted for the Secretary of State for Education.